Couvrez ce phénomène que je ne saurais voir.
Sur le droit de tout voir (ou pas) en phénoménologie : Husserl entre Brentano et Natorp.
By its very name, phenomenology seems to invoke a priority claim on phenomena. And yet it has not been necessary to wait for phenomenology in oder to have a proper account of phenomena. One need only to take a look at the history of philosophy, from Plato to Kant, as well as at the history of sciences, from physics to psychology, so as to register a wide range of uses concerning the concept of phenomenon. The understanding of what a phenomenon is, in a phenomenological sense, should therefore at least not be completely compatible with any other, if phenomenology has to exist as a discipline and as a method. That is one of the issues at stake in the debate between phenomenology and neokantianism, between Husserl, to a certain extent Brentano, and Natorp. It is on this debate that we shall drawn attention, if we wish to grasp the reasons behind the phenomenological conception of the phenomenon, especially at the time of the Logische Untersuchungen.